Addressing the Calvinist Claim That God Can Irresisitibly Cause (Make) People to “Freely” Love Him

Below is a recent response to a Calvinist in a discussion forum which addresses the oft repeated Calvinist claim that while God works in the elect irresistibly, the elect still freely come to Christ in such a way that their free will is not violated. In other words, Calvinists often say that it is a misrepresentation of Calvinism to suggest that God saves people “against their will”, while it seems that their theological claims cannot actually avoid that logical conclusion.  This is a part of a conversation I recently had with a Calvinist that made this claim:

Calvinist: “My wife made me willing to love her the first time I saw her. She was so appealing to me I knew that I had to have her. That is what the Lord does to His people. He makes us willing by showing us our desperate need of Him and then the beauty of His salvation. He makes us willing by giving us a new heart to know our need and to see the wonder of the truth of the Gospel as it is in Christ.”

Me: “But prior to that we were God haters who wanted nothing to do with God, so the analogy fails. And we didn’t want a “new heart” prior to God giving us one (in Calvinism, since in my view the new heart is clearly and Biblically the result of faith, and not the cause). It would be like someone using a mind control device in someone who hated broccoli and controlling the mind in such a way that it suddenly found broccoli irresistibly attractive. Would we say that the person then freely chose to love broccoli? Of course not.”

Calvinist: “That is why Christ said that you must be born again in order to even see the kingdom of God. The new nature must come before faith. God making us willing is not mind control in the sense that you describe it but giving us a new nature and a new mind. Of course the analogy isn’t perfect but it does illustrate the fact that we can be made to love without it being against our will.”

Me: “No it doesn’t. If we were God haters that wanted nothing to do with Christ prior to His irresistible act of “giving us a new heart” that “makes us willing”, then it was certainly “against our will” because our will was to hate and reject God prior to His irresistible working in us. It would be like a man meeting a girl at a bar and the girl doesn’t like him and wants nothing to do with him. In fact, she finds him repulsive. So the man slips a pill in her drink that removes her inhibitions and causes her to begin to find him attractive, even to the point of “making her willing” to sleep with him. Now if this incident was brought before the court, would the court say that the man is not liable for violating the woman against her will, since the pill he put in her drink “made her willing”? Of course not. Nobody would say that she freely chose to be with the man under such circumstances, and no one would say that her will was not violated.”

“As distasteful as this illustration might be, it illustrates the exact same principle behind your claims that while God “makes us willing” this making us willing by “giving us a new heart” is not a violation of the person’s will. Instead of dropping a pill into our drink, God drops a “new heart” into our God hating chest. The only difference would be that in your view of how God works, the “effects” of the “drug” would never wear off. But that doesn’t change the fact that a person’s will has been obviously violated in the process.”

“It really is pretty simple. If God’s working faith into us is not resistible, but irresistible, then it certainly violates freedom and the will. That is so obvious, it shouldn’t even need to be pointed out. If you want to say that God irresistibly brings sinners to faith and love and devotion to Him (by irresistibly removing their “hate God heart” and putting in a “love God heart”) because you think the Bible teaches that, then fine. But trying to then claim that God does this in such a way that we freely come to him in such a way that our wills are not violated is clearly incoherent. You can’t have it both ways. Sorry.”

Related posts:

Resistible Grace or Sinless Perfection? A Call For Theological Precision in the Calvinist Accounting of Monergistic Conversion

The Reality of Choice and the Testimony of Scripture

No Real Choice in Calvinism

Is The “New Heart” of Ezekiel 36:26-27 a Reference to Regeneration Preceding Faith

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12 Responses

  1. I agree with your reasoning. One thing that always sticks out to me is the line, “you must be born again in order to even see the kingdom of God.” I may have said this before, but the way I understand the idea of “seeing” the kingdom in John 3:3 is not a spiritual/mental seeing prior to conversion so much as it is the actualization of attaining salvation–thus the parallel phrasing of Jesus in John 3:5 when he says you cannot enter. We can confirm that language later in John 3:36 and fin other examples in the Bible as in Psalm 34:12.

    Thanks for the post, it’s good to hear from you.

  2. Gene,

    I agree with you, and Calvinist D. A. Carson does too,

    “To a Jew with the background and convictions of Nicodemus, “to see the kingdom of God” was to participate in the kingdom at the end of the age, to experience eternal, resurrection life. The same equivalence is found in the Synoptics (cf. Mk. 9:43, 45 ‘to enter life’, parallel to 9:47 ‘to enter the kingdom of God/); it is particularly strong in the Fourth Gospel, where ‘kingdom’ language crops up only here (3:3, 5) and at Jesus’ trial (18:36) while ‘life’ language predominates. One of the most startling features of the kingdom announced in the Synoptics is that it is not exclusively future. The kingdom, God’s saving and transforming reign, has in certain respects already been inaugurated in the personal works and message of Jesus.” (D.A. Carson, The Gospel According To John, P. 188 )

    From: https://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2007/08/20/does-jesus-teach-that-regeneration-precedes-faith-in-john-33-6/

    Good to hear from you too.

  3. I don’t think it’s advisable to insist too strongly that somebody cannot be under a necessity of loving something without his will being “violated.”

    Arminius himself says that we love “the Good” in general with natural necessity, and have liberty of choice only with respect to finite goods. He also strongly indicates that in heaven, when we see God face to face, he will appear so satisfying to us that we cannot help but love him.

    So classical Arminians and Calvinists seem to agree that, under certain conditions, man can be under a necessity of loving God without suffering violence to his will. The difference is on when – e.g., does it occur in this life at regeneration or only when we go to be with God in eternity.

    It is for this reason that the analogy of the drugged date doesn’t really work. In that example, the woman’s judgment changes because the drug impedes her rational powers and puts her, to some degree, out of touch with reality. The necessary love of God (posited by Calvinists as consequent upon regeneration and by Arminius as consequent upon the beatific vision) is quite the opposite – it results from an apprehension of God as he truly is in himself, unclouded by contrary human passions and attitudes.

  4. Dave,

    Thanks for the thoughtful and challenging comment.

    I don’t think it’s advisable to insist too strongly that somebody cannot be under a necessity of loving something without his will being “violated.”

    I think it is problematic to insist that one can be free while still under “necessity.” Being under necessity is essentially the opposite of being free. The argument I am addressing says that you can make someone respond a certain way in an irresistible manner (with no ability to respond in any other way) and yet the person who is being irresistibly “made to” respond that way is still responding freely without the will being violated. That is the main point the drug analogy is meant to respond to.

    Arminius himself says that we love “the Good” in general with natural necessity, and have liberty of choice only with respect to finite goods.

    I am not familiar with this from Arminius, though I do not doubt this could be his view (I have read a lot from Arminius but have not read him exhaustively). Do you have a reference for me so I can check it out more thoroughly?

    At any rate, I would not agree with Arminius on this point in the way you have explained it. I don’t think that we do naturally love the good necessarily. Indeed, my strong Arminian doctrine of total depravity implies that we do not in fact naturally love the good necessarily or otherwise. We could say that we generally love what we perceive to be good for us, but that is not the same as loving the “good” in an absolute sense, or being under a necessity to do so. But again, if we are under necessity, then we are not free. So insisting that we can love of necessity does not address the claim that we can “freely” love of necessity, or the claim that such is the case in God’s irresistible work of converting the elect from God haters to God lovers (which is what this post is specifically addressing).

    He also strongly indicates that in heaven, when we see God face to face, he will appear so satisfying to us that we cannot help but love him.

    But who would this be true for? Would this be true for the reprobate? When they see God will they fall in love with Him in heaven? Were the angles under necessity to love God by being in His presence? If so, how do we explain their rebellion? I don’t see any reason to think that falling in love with God when we see Him face to face is something that is not still rooted in genuine freedom. Those who freely chose to love God will love Him all the more (even perfectly) when they see Him (and that is exactly what they freely wanted to do prior to seeing Him face to face). Those who rejected and hated Him will likely hate Him all the more and fear Him rather than love Him when they see Him face to face in heaven (in accordance with their rejection of Him prior to seeing Him).

    So classical Arminians and Calvinists seem to agree that, under certain conditions, man can be under a necessity of loving God without suffering violence to his will. The difference is on when – e.g., does it occur in this life at regeneration or only when we go to be with God in eternity.

    I don’t think this follows as noted above, nor does it address the specifics of my counter-argument.

    It is for this reason that the analogy of the drugged date doesn’t really work. In that example, the woman’s judgment changes because the drug impedes her rational powers and puts her, to some degree, out of touch with reality. The necessary love of God (posited by Calvinists as consequent upon regeneration and by Arminius as consequent upon the beatific vision) is quite the opposite – it results from an apprehension of God as he truly is in himself, unclouded by contrary human passions and attitudes.

    But this still does not address the main point. The Calvinist argument is that we are irresistibly made to “freely” love God. You have argued for the idea of loving under necessity. Being made to love under necessity is not the same as being made to “freely” love under necessity (especially when prior to that “making” we wanted nothing to do with God and certainly did not want to be made to love Him, however that might be irresistibly “made” to take place). A Calvinist could say that this is true in the sense of compatibilistic freedom, but that is not how the argument is framed (and I would say that compatibilism is plainly incoherent, and this example illustrates the point).

    So I think your specific objection to the drug analogy misses the point and also presses the details unnecessarily. It could be changed quite easily. Say that someone had a magic device that allowed its user to control other people. There is a woman who hates the guy who wields the magic device and does not want anything to do with him, and does not want him to change her will with the device to loving him. He has made it known he wants her to marry him, but she rejects him. If he uses that device and irresistibly changes her will to loving him, then it is clear that her love of him would not be free, and indeed, it is clear that his changing of her will would in essence be coercion.

  5. Being under necessity is essentially the opposite of being free. The argument I am addressing says that you can make someone respond a certain way in an irresistible manner (with no ability to respond in any other way) and yet the person who is being irresistibly “made to” respond that way is still responding freely without the will be violated.

    I would argue that you are conflating different things here. I agree that if we define “freedom” as “the power to do otherwise than one actually does,” then freedom and necessity are mutually exclusive. But I am challenging your assumption that being under a necessity of loving something always constitutes a *violation of the will*.

    My position, and I am quite sure it was Arminius’s as well, is that the will inclines by natural necessity to the universal good and to happiness. I don’t freely choose to desire the good or to desire to be happy, but that doesn’t mean my will is being violated in desiring those things.

    Likewise, God doesn’t choose to love righteousness and hate sin – he could not make himself love evil! But surely you wouldn’t say that God’s will is being violated in this respect?

    Do you have a reference for me [to Arminius’s view] so I can check it out more thoroughly?

    “But the will has an inclination to good. Yet this is either, according to the mode of its nature, to universal good and to that which is the chief good, or, according to the mode of liberty, to all other [kinds of] good.” http://www.ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works2.iii.xxvi.html

    “The Divine Will is borne towards its object, either according to the mode of Nature, or according to the mode of Liberty. According to the mode of Nature, it tends towards a primary and proper object, one that is suitable and adequate to its nature. According to the mode of Liberty, it tends towards all other things. Thus, God by a natural necessity wills himself; but He wills freely all other things.” http://www.ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works1.v.v.html

    Emphasis on “natural necessity,” which Arminius clearly uses as synonymous with “according to the mode of Nature.”

    We could say that we generally love what we perceive to be good for us, but that is not the same as loving the “good” in an absolute sense, or being under a necessity to do so.

    In context, “the good” does not refer to moral good specifically. Goodness can refer to what is virtuous, pleasurable, or useful. Obviously the human will is not necessarily inclined to the moral good. But we never choose anything that does not seem to us good in some respect. Even people who commit suicide only do so because they judge it better to die than to suffer.

    So insisting that we can love of necessity does not address the claim that we can “freely” love of necessity, or the claim that such is the case in God’s irresistible work of converting the elect from God haters to God lovers (which is what this post is specifically addressing).

    If we are under a necessity of loving something, by definition we are not “free” not to love it, but this does not mean our will is being violated. Again: God, by necessity of his very nature, loves righteousness. He is not free not to love it. But we would not say that this constitutes a violation of the divine will.

    But who would this be true for? Would this be true for the reprobate? When they see God will they fall in love with Him in heaven?

    This objection assumes that the reprobate will “see God” in the same sense as the redeemed. When Jesus said, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,” I don’t think he was describing a vision of God common to the righteous and the wicked alike. Likewise with John’s comment in Revelation 21.4.

    Were the angels under necessity to love God by being in His presence? If so, how do we explain their rebellion?

    Again, this assumes that the angels in their original state had the same experience of the presence of God as the saints in glory will, which cannot be proven.

    I don’t see any reason to think that falling in love with God when we see Him face to face is something that is not still rooted in genuine freedom. Those who freely chose to love God will love Him all the more (even perfectly) when they see Him (and that is exactly what they freely wanted to do prior to seeing Him face to face).

    So do you think that the redeemed in heaven will be capable of hating God? In heaven, will we always be in danger of yet again falling away from God? If we will not be free to fall away, by your own criteria, doesn’t that mean our wills will be eternally violated?

    To sum up with a syllogism:

    1) Since the will necessarily inclines toward the universal good and happiness, it necessarily embraces what the mind judges to be good in every respect and conducive to perfect happiness.
    2) But God, when seen “face to face,” is necessarily judged by the mind to be good in every respect and conducive to perfect happiness.
    3) Ergo, the will necessarily embraces God when seen “face to face.”

  6. I should also note that, on this view, the will can embrace with absolute necessity only what the mind perceives to be infinitely good. No creature can ever be perceived this way, except to a very deluded intellect, so all illustrations about date drugs and mind control devices are beside the point.

  7. I think the biggest problem with IRRESISTIBLE Grace is not violation of will, but rather eternal damnation. The one who perishes was never irresistibly drawn. God is least interested in his salvation else He would have irresistibly drawn him.

    I have never met a Calvinist who countenanced NOT being irresistibly drawn.

  8. Dave,

    Sorry it took so long to approve your comments. Things have been very busy lately. I do intend to address your response but probably won’t be able to until after Easter.

    God bless.

  9. Dave,

    Sorry it took so long for me to respond to this. In response to my point that necessity is the opposite of freedom, you wrote:

    I would argue that you are conflating different things here. I agree that if we define “freedom” as “the power to do otherwise than one actually does,” then freedom and necessity are mutually exclusive. But I am challenging your assumption that being under a necessity of loving something always constitutes a *violation of the will*.

    Right, but I deny your assertion that freedom is possible when the will is necessitated, and you haven’t given any reason to think that a necessitated will can still be free. Indeed, you admit that if freedom is the power to do otherwise than it cannot, by definition, be necessitated, and the power of contrary choice is the normal and correct definition of freedom. So your denial that being under a necessity of loving something always constitutes a violation of the will is unpersuasive.

    A violation of the will in the context of my illustration means that it is irresistibly caused to change from one direction to another direction, and in the Calvinist accounting of conversion the will is necessarily (i.e. irresistibly) turned from hating to loving. That is, it began in a state of hating God and wanting nothing to do with Him, and then it was irresistibly turned to loving Him. That irresistible turning seems to me to be an obvious violation of the will that was, according to Calvinism, necessarily set on hating God. The will did not freely choose anything, it was irresistibly moved from one direction to another (opposite) direction.

    “My position, and I am quite sure it was Arminius’s as well, is that the will inclines by natural necessity to the universal good and to happiness. I don’t freely choose to desire the good or to desire to be happy, but that doesn’t mean my will is being violated in desiring those things.”

    Yes, you already said that, and I provided counter considerations to that view that I believe show it to be false (specifically the issue of inclination to universal good, though I do think we are naturally inclined to what makes us happy, but it is up to us to freely decide what makes us happy). Moreover, you did not really provide any reason to think your claims (and Arminius’ on the same specific point) are correct. You explained your point of view without giving any good reason to accept them.

    The one point of support you seemed to give was that it was Arminius’ view. But that is not a good reason to accept something in my opinion. That is simply an appeal to authority. However, you do provide some argumentation for your view in the new comments to which I am responding, and I will take those up now. But first, with regards to Arminius view, here is the quote you referenced along with some other quotes from that same section you linked to:

    “For the understanding apprehends eternity and truth both universal and particular, by a natural and necessary, and therefore by a uniform act. But the will has an inclination to good. Yet this is either, according to the mode of its nature, to universal good and to that which is the chief good; or, according to the mode of liberty, to all other [kinds of] good…”

    “This righteousness and wisdom are called “original,” both because man had them from his very origin, and because, if man had continued in his integrity, they would also have been communicated to his posterity…”

    “According to this state or condition, there is a mutual relation between man and the good things of this world, the effect of which is, that man can desire them, and, in procuring them for himself, can bestow that labour which he deems to be necessary and convenient.”

    When we take all this together, it seems obvious to me that Arminius does not mean that by “nature” we are necessitated in a certain direction with regards to our specific choices. In other words, there is a difference between what we may naturally perceive and what we choose based on that perception. For example, the first quote states that man in his innocent state “apprehends truth” by a “natural and necessary act”, and yet Adam chose to believe the lie when tempted, just as Arminius acknowledges in the second paragraph- he did not remain in his state of “integrity.” And he also states that “the effect of which is, that man can desire them [good things of the world]”. Note the use of “can” which implies ability only instead of the use of “must” which implies necessitation.

    You write:

    “Likewise, God doesn’t choose to love righteousness and hate sin – he could not make himself love evil! But surely you wouldn’t say that God’s will is being violated in this respect?”

    God’s will is not violated in that respect. But God’s situation is profoundly different than ours. He is a non-contingent being and the sole and ultimate source of his will to love righteousness and hate sin. He is under no necessity not imposed by himself alone with regard to loving righteousness and hating sin. The case is completely different with human beings, who are contingent and have any necessity on them ultimately placed upon them from outside themselves.

    So the example of God does not do justice to the Calvinist scenario in which God irresistibly moves the will from one direction to another, when the creature does not want his will moved in that direction prior to that irresistible act. There is no power that could irresistibly move God’s will from loving righteousness and hating sin to loving sin and hating righteousness. But if there were, it would be hard not to see that as a violation of God’s will. So with regards to this specific example, appeals to God’s will or freedom do not really help your case.

    “In context, “the good” does not refer to moral good specifically. Goodness can refer to what is virtuous, pleasurable, or useful. Obviously the human will is not necessarily inclined to the moral good. But we never choose anything that does not seem to us good in some respect. Even people who commit suicide only do so because they judge it better to die than to suffer.

    Right, but this does not support your point. It is not a matter of our choosing what we perceive to be best so much as the freedom to determine that value. To say that some idea of what is best necessarily compels us to choose is question begging. Rather, we freely value one thing (object, motive, desire, etc.) over another. We weigh the options and determine what is best (or what will make us happy, as Arminius put it), which constitutes the choice. What you seem to be saying is that the options or motives have a weight all their own that necessarily moves the will in certain directions. I deny that, and you have not demonstrated why that should be the case.

    “If we are under a necessity of loving something, by definition we are not “free” not to love it, but this does not mean our will is being violated. Again: God, by necessity of his very nature, loves righteousness. He is not free not to love it. But we would not say that this constitutes a violation of the divine will.”

    I have answered your appeal to the nature of God’s freedom above, and so find that there is no basis for your assertion in your first sentence here. If one is put under necessity by another against one’s will to desire or do x, then one’s will is being violated.

    With regards to the angels, I think that we have very good Biblical reasons to assume that the angels did perceive God accurately and yet many still rebelled. To suggest that because they fell this proves they did not perceive him accurately is obvious question begging. So I think the case of the angels rebelling against God is a major problem for your view and can only be rebutted by assuming your view to be accurate in such a way that the example of the angles becomes inadmissible.

    But if many angels did not rebel because they did see God accurately, which it seems you must concede in accordance with your overall argument, then we have every reason to assume that the angels who rebelled likewise viewed God accurately and yet were able to choose against him.

    As far as the reprobate not seeing God accurately in the afterlife, that may or may not be the case. It is based on speculation. But for your point to stand I think you would need to effectively demonstrate that they would not see God accurately in the afterlife. However, it still remains that in my view believers who see God in the afterlife will see Him as He is against the backdrop of already freely choosing to love God prior to that moment. So it does not follow that in that moment they will love God of necessity. So the “either they love God of necessity now or later” dichotomy you have advocated has not been effectively demonstrated.

    “So do you think that the redeemed in heaven will be capable of hating God? In heaven, will we always be in danger of yet again falling away from God?”

    Capable, yes. In danger, no. That is, we will still be able to hate God, but it is certain that we will never choose to due to our new glorified natures and the removal of temptation. But there is a critical difference between certainty and necessity. As one Arminian well said: “If I was intent on eating and someone placed my favorite food before me and a plate of feces, it would be certain that I would choose to eat my favorite food even though I could choose to eat the feces. And there might be various reasons for me to choose to eat one or the other. Apart from very unusual and extreme circumstances, I can tell you it is certain that I would choose my favorite food. In Heaven, there will be no unusual and extreme circumstances that would lead the Saints to hate God. But that does not mean they will be under necessity to love him.”

    And I would add that even if God did necessitate the will in some sense in heaven, it would still be based on a prior free choice on earth. In essence, God would be giving us exactly what we have always freelywanted, but were unable to fully attain on earth- a will that is fully and perfectly submitted to God. In that sense, God would be fulfilling our greatest desire rather than violating it. So again, the “either we will necessarily love now or then” dichotomy you have proposed would still fail as the heavenly state would still be fully dependent and even in response to the earthly state and the free choice made in that state.

    “If we will not be free to fall away, by your own criteria, doesn’t that mean our wills will be eternally violated?”

    No, see above. First, I don’t hold we will not be free to fall away, and second, even if it were necessitated, it could be based on a freely chosen desire made permanent by God as a way of honoring, rather than “violating”, that prior freely chosen desire to be fully submitted to the Lord.

    “To sum up with a syllogism:

    1) Since the will necessarily inclines toward the universal good and happiness, it necessarily embraces what the mind judges to be good in every respect and conducive to perfect happiness.
    2) But God, when seen “face to face,” is necessarily judged by the mind to be good in every respect and conducive to perfect happiness.
    3) Ergo, the will necessarily embraces God when seen “face to face.””

    I find that the syllogism is false. Premise 1 is false. The will does not *necessarily* incline toward the universal good. I think it does toward happiness, but the mind is free to judge what will give happiness. It is free to value one option, motive, desire, etc. over another- that is the very essence of free will, and probably what Arminius meant as a qualifier in stating “…or, according to the mode of liberty, to all other [kinds of] good…” ).

    Number 2 is also false. It is mere assertion. I see no reason to think that when we see God “face to face,” he is necessarily judged by the mind to be good in every respect and conducive to perfect happiness. You are merely assuming what you are trying to prove and begging the question. So 3 does not follow in the least. it is founded on totally false premises. it only takes 1 false premise to falsify a conclusion, but every premise in your syllogism is false!

    God Bless,
    Ben

  10. Reblogged this on SOTERIOLOGY 101.

  11. The characteristic of an unfalsifiable belief:
    Unfalsifiability is increasingly being understood as providing psychological utility. People model their modes of perception to allow for their desires to become reality. One of the characteristics noted is that when rational arguments for a belief prove to be fallacious, the defender will typically fall back on further supportive arguments that are in themselves increasingly unfalsifiable. At some point when all rationality is exhausted, the last fall-back is an inscrutable or mystery argument. A second form of evasion is to simply demand all critical analysis false. And a third form of evasion is the perennial stream of ad-hoc equivocations. Acknowledging inscrutability is at least a show of being honest with one’s self. But when a person moves to one of the other two strategies, dialog is pretty much fruitless.

  12. Concerning be able to hate God in heaven, I believe something Jesus said once will help bring light to this subject. ESV: John 20:29. Then Jesus told him, “You believe because you have seen me. Blessed are those who believe without seeing me.”
    Most people in heaven (except for those who saw Jesus when He lived on Earth) will be those who loved Jesus without seeing Him. In this way, we are different than Satan and the angels who sided with him. Though they had seen God, they still rebelled against Him.
    Those saved through the blood of Jesus will be the ones who “believed without seeing.”
    This is what God wants. He wants a people who will not turn on Him later as Satan and his angels did. He wants a people, who despite trials, heartache and pain on this earth, chose Him anyway–without seeing Him.
    These are the kind of people who will not leave God. They chose Him before receiving the benefits of heaven. They chose Him before seeing His glory. They chose Him despite temptation and lusts of the flesh.
    Those kind of people will not turn away from God in heaven. They have already proven it while here.
    This theory does not provide an answer for those who die in infancy or who die before the age of accountability. However, my belief in that God is a just God causes me to rest assured His plan provides a more full answer.

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